

22 June 1962

1. Mr. Sheldon
2. Mr. Cline

a. The attached memo for the USIB on the Coordination Staff's Report regarding the Committee structure of the USIB will probably come up at the 27 June meeting. Among other recommendations it takes the National Intelligence Survey Committee out of the USIB structure and has CIA conduct its own coordination with the individual agencies involved.

STAT b. [] feels strongly that this is wrong and there is a memo from him attached stating his position.

STAT
STAT c. Also for your information, I have attached a paper I wrote for Bob Amory summarizing our offices views on the [] paper. You will note Bob Amory's hand-written comments in the margin. There were passed to [] for his consideration in drafting the formal USIB memo.

[]

STAT

SECRET

USIB-D-27.1/18
31 May 1962

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Coordination Staff Report Regarding the Committee
Structure of the United States Intelligence Board

Attached for review is a memorandum report by the Coordination Staff on Committees of the United States Intelligence Board. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early USIB meeting (probably that of 27 June), for discussion and action on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 8 through 12 of the attachment to memorandum.

25X1

25X1

Executive Secretary

Attachments

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

Attachment
USIB-D-27.1/18
28 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Committees of the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB)

1. The attachment on the subject is a response to your assignment of 18 December 1961 to the Coordination Staff to conduct a review and prepare recommendations for revisions in the present committee structure of the USIB.

2. The attachment is also a response to Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 33 which called for a review of the functions and activities of the USIB committees, including consideration of possible changes and improved reporting procedures, and will also provide a basis for a response to the White House request of 25 October 1961 for information regarding interdepartmental committees and task forces.

3. The attachment concludes that USIB needs some type of committee structure to assist it in meeting its broad responsibilities and that the desirable modifications to the present structure would be those that:

a. recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of the intelligence community occasioned both by the experience and mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the potential for greater coordination within the Department of Defense resulting from the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);

b. recognize that services of common concern, like assigned functions or primary responsibility, are essentially functions which can and should be charged directly to an individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the particular service or function and for its coordination throughout the community;

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

c. recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis, only those committees that are clearly required to support functions specified for USIB in National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1 or to coordinate certain important functional programs (other than services of common concern) which are carried out necessarily by several agencies to meet their own and community needs.

On that basis, the following 12 committees and ad hoc working groups would be disestablished and their functions reassigned as indicated:

<u>Committee</u>	<u>Assignment of Functions</u>
International Communism	State
Exchanges	CIA
National Intelligence Survey (NIS)	CIA
Critical Communications (CCC)	CIA
Emergency Planning Steering	DCI
Cuban Military Build-up (ad hoc)	Defense
Berlin Situation (ad hoc)	When and if it resumes activity, subordinate to Watch Committee.
Arab-Israeli Working Group (ad hoc)	USIB in connection with weekly survey of cold war situation.
Legislative Proposals re Personnel (ad hoc)	Not required once committee has completed its current report.

The following 12 committees would be retained: Security; SIGINT; Documentation (CODIB); Watch; Critical Collection Problems (CCPC); Economic Intelligence (EIC); Scientific Intelligence (SIC); Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence (JAEIC); Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence (GMAIC); Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR); Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities (IPC)

4. With respect to committee chairmen, the attachment concludes that selection of a chairman should be based on the concept that the principle of personal qualification rather than agency affiliation

Corrected page - 7 June 1962.

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T


S-E-C-R-E-T

should prevail where there is difficulty in determining a single dominant agency interest; that where the interest of a single agency is clearly dominant, that agency should furnish the chairman.

5. With respect to the USIB Secretariat, the attachment concludes that the Secretariat should devote increased efforts in ensuring that papers coming before the Board have had, where appropriate, adequate preliminary coordination and in conducting an effective follow-up system on Board decisions.

6. Recommendation:

That the attachment, together with this memorandum, be circulated to the USIB for consideration of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 8 through 12 thereof.



Assistant for Coordination

Attachment:

REC

25X1

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Attachment
USIB-D-27.1/18
28 May 1962

COMMITTEES OF THE U. S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD

1. Recommendation No. 33 of the Joint Study Group (JSG) reflects, with respect to the intelligence community, the growing general disillusionment within the Executive Departments of an excessive use of the committee system of business. That recommendation calls for a review of "the functions and activities of the several committees and subcommittees of the United States Intelligence Board." It further directs that "this review should include consideration of possible change in the committee structure and improved reporting procedures." Implicit in the Joint Study Group's recommendation on this point and in its recommendations for a reorganization of USIB itself is concern at the ponderous appearance of the complex committee structure which now characterizes the organization of the intelligence community. The concern, however, does not appear to be directed at the functions with which the committees are charged but rather at the question of whether the functions need to be assigned to committees or, in fact, can most efficiently be performed by committees.

2. Now that the membership of USIB itself may be reduced and that the Defense Intelligence Agency has the responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities within the various elements of the Department of Defense (save those under the control of the National Security Agency), there are occurring basic changes in the high-level structure of U. S. intelligence which even more clearly imply a need for change at the supporting level. The observations that follow are directed at establishing a concept of coordinated support for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and for the USIB that is workable, efficient, and compatible with the top structure. As will appear -- and again the point is emphasized -- there is little question that the great majority of the USIB committees have been and are performing useful functions. The suggestions below are designed to ensure that the functions are carried out under closer supervision and clearer assignment of responsibility.

3. At the present time, USIB has 20 permanent and four ad hoc committees, concerned with a variety of production, collection and support activities. The purposes for which these committees have been established fall, in a general sense, into three categories:

- a. to provide a mechanism for achieving coordination of a specific community-wide activity, such as economic intelligence;

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

b. to provide a mechanism for providing community guidance to an activity of common concern, such as domestic exploitation of non-government organizations and individuals for foreign intelligence purposes;

c. to assist USIB in carrying out one of its assigned functions, such as security.

4. The general functions of USIB are specified in NSCID No. 1. In addition to assisting the DCI to carry out his coordination functions, USIB has certain other specific responsibilities, in brief:

a. Establish policies and programs for the guidance of departments and agencies.

b. Establish priority national intelligence objectives and requirements.

c. Review and report to the National Security Council (NSC) on the national foreign intelligence effort.

d. Make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters, particularly to the Secretary of Defense concerning matters under the cognizance of the Director, National Security Agency (NSA).

e. Develop and review security standards and practices.

f. Formulate policies concerning arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

5. It is clear that USIB needs some type of committee structure to assist it in meeting these broad responsibilities. The variety of problems for which the Board has responsibility places a heavy burden upon the members. The Board deals effectively with national estimates, in large part because the mechanism of the Office of National Estimates (ONE) provides for community-wide staffing of the problem and for clear definition of points at issue. It also receives comparable coordinated support through the Watch Committee procedure. On other problems, particularly in the field of collection, the Board has had less effective machinery for coordination and for the initiation of remedial action and too often has faced such problems at a late date, sometimes without benefit of community-wide proposals for their solution and with less than adequate knowledge of the views and reasoning of other agencies regarding them.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

6. Various alternatives have been suggested. One that has some appeal is a structure composed of three high-level committees, one for Production, one for Collection and one for Support. Within this trio could be logically encompassed, functionally, the various responsibilities now charged to all the USIB Committees and to USIB. Under this concept, the senior committees would be composed of the chiefs or their deputies of the production, collection and support components, respectively, of the USIB agencies. At this level the individuals involved, being specialists in production, collection or support, could take action to ensure that their principals in USIB were called upon only for decisions of the highest order. Upon further analysis, however, it becomes apparent that there are important weaknesses in this line of solution. In the first place, there is no demonstrable need for a "Support" committee, since USIB is not charged with the administrative, logistics, legal, comptroller and similar responsibilities inherent in the operations of the individual intelligence agencies. In the second place, it is very difficult to establish that a production committee is necessary or even appropriate to meet USIB's needs for coordination of the production effort of the community. As mentioned earlier, the estimative process developed and operated by the community through the ONE as the DCI's instrument is a proven and effective method of demonstrating in broad terms the community's capability to produce all types of intelligence required in support of national security policies. The Watch Committee process adequately covers the problem of indications of hostilities. Two major fields of intelligence production for which responsibility is necessarily assigned to a number of agencies and therefore require community coordination, are scientific and economic. For both of these technical, specialized fields, mechanisms for coordination are already available through existing scientific and economic committees.

The factors which argue against the establishment of production and support committees are not, however, so apparent in the field of collection. In this field, in fact, (as will appear in paragraph 9.h. below) it would seem that a modification of the existing Critical Collection Problems Committee could well benefit the community.

7. The desirable modifications in the present USIB committee structure would be those that:

a. recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of the intelligence community occasioned both by the experience and mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the potential for greater coordination within the Department of Defense resulting from the establishment of the DIA;

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

b. recognize that services of common concern, like assigned functions of primary responsibility, are essentially functions which can be and should be charged directly to an individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the particular service or function and for its coordination throughout the community;

c. recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis, only those committees that are clearly required to support functions specified for USIB in NSCID No. 1 or to coordinate certain important functional programs (other than services of common concern) which are carried out necessarily by several agencies to meet their own and community needs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8.* The following USIB committees should be disestablished and their general functions reassigned:

a. Committee on International Communism. This Committee has been relatively inactive for some time and there does not appear to be a demonstrated justification for the continuation of a committee in this field. The Committee's assigned functions are essentially elements of an important aspect of political intelligence for which the Department of State has production responsibility, except for the production of National Intelligence Survey sections which have been transferred to CIA. The Committee's functions should, therefore, be assigned to the Department of State. Coordination should be achieved through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

* Throughout this section will be noted the recurring phrase "specified points of contact designated by interested agencies." In disestablishing an existing committee and charging its functions to an individual agency, it seemed unwise to specify the manner in which that agency should conduct its stewardship. On the other hand, as a protection to the responsible agency and as a means of avoiding possible problems relating to "command channels," it seemed necessary to provide official "action" points within each agency, to be made known community-wide, which would ensure effective official interagency relationships. The responsible agency would thus have a flexible mechanism that permits: (a) bilateral and multilateral relationships on an ad hoc basis without the formality of group consensus; or (b) when appropriate, group meetings of all the "points of contact." In this system, of course, any agency that feels that its interests are not being sufficiently cared for has the right of direct appeal to USIB.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1



c. Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications. DCID No. 2/4 charges CIA with providing for the exploitation of foreign language publications as a service of common concern. The Committee should be eliminated as a USIB instrument and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

d. Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications (PROCIB). DCID No. 2/5 assigns to CIA responsibility for coordinating the foreign publications procurement programs. The Committee should be eliminated as an instrument of the USIB, and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

e. Committee on Exchanges. The Committee was established for two main purposes: (a) to provide coordinated advice to the Department of State on the intelligence aspects of the East-West exchange program in order that State can consider those aspects alongside other policy consideration in carrying out its overall responsibility for that program; and (b) to ensure coordinated intelligence exploitation of the program. As a practical matter, partly because of time factors involved, the Committee's functions have for some time been carried out primarily by CIA, which has provided this coordination service through established points of contact as if it were a service of common concern. Moreover, much of the Committee's advice on substantive matters, because of the specialized nature of such matters, is in reality the product of ad hoc groups or existing specialized committees. The need for the Committee has thus become minimal. It should be disestablished and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

- 5 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

f. National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Committee. NSCID No. 3 assigns to the Director of Central Intelligence responsibility for coordinating production and for accomplishing the publication and dissemination of National Intelligence Surveys. The NSC, by its approval in 1948 of the NIS Standard Instructions, required that CIA provide overall coordination of the NIS Program. By the same action it created the NIS Committee to assist the CIA in carrying out this primary responsibility for the program. The Committee should be eliminated and CIA receive whatever assistance it requires through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.*

g. Emergency Planning Steering Committee. This committee was created by USIB action and, when active, concerned itself largely with emergency relocation matters. The Committee has been inactive for more than a year. It is doubtful that this committee or any similar committee can proceed successfully in the broad field of emergency planning since there is uncertainty as to the respective intelligence responsibilities of the USIB agencies within the continental U. S. in time of general war and with respect to the wartime role of the DCI in providing intelligence advice and support to the President. A clarification of national policy on these points is essential to realistic overall intelligence war planning. The present Committee should be dis-established and the DCI, as the principal intelligence coordinator of the U. S. foreign intelligence effort, should undertake to obtain this clarification.

h. Critical Communications Committee (CCC). This committee was formed primarily to assist USIB in establishing and monitoring the system for reporting critical intelligence. The role of USIB itself is to assist the DCI in carrying out the latter's responsibilities under NSCID No. 7 to provide continuing guidance to the Secretary of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence, and to define critical intelligence and establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence. Now that a well understood system for reporting critical intelligence

* NSC approval for this change is not required, since NSCID No. 3 of 18 January 1961 permits amendments to the NIS Standard Instructions by interdepartmental approval.

S-E-C-R-E-T

has been established, this Committee should be disestablished,* and the CIA should be made responsible for assuring continued monitoring of the reporting system, and for assisting the DCI to carry out his continuing responsibilities under NSCID No. 7. The Secretary of Defense also has continuing responsibilities under NSCID No. 7 for the establishment, operation and perfection of the means of communication for critical intelligence, which he should continue to exercise. Specific points of contact should be designated by all interested agencies as well as by the Department of Defense and CIA to ensure proper coordination of their respective efforts in this field.

9. The following USIB committees should be retained or modified (See Tab A):

a. Security Committee. The Security Committee provides direct support to USIB with respect to a specific function assigned to USIB by NSCID No. 1, namely, the development and review of security standards and practices. It should therefore be retained.

b. The SIGINT Committee. The SIGINT Committee provides advice and assistance to USIB in direct support of all the functions related to COMINT and ELINT matters assigned to USIB by NSCID Nos. 1 and 6, including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and other officials, as appropriate, on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director, NSA. It should therefore be retained.

c. Committee on Documentation (CODIB). The Committee on Documentation should be retained since it supports USIB with respect to the coordination of important, complex, accelerating programs necessarily conducted by most USIB agencies and influenced by similar programs in progress in many non-USIB agencies. Moreover, it directly supports USIB in carrying out approved JSG Recommendation No. 40 relating to automatic data processing systems.

d. Watch Committee. The Watch Committee, in view of its special relation to an important USIB function directly related to the national security and the necessity for broad community participation in finalizing reports within urgent time limits on imminence of hostilities, should also be retained.

* In view of certain unfinished business that is now before the Committee, it is suggested that the act of disestablishment be deferred until 1 July 1962.

Corrected page - 7 June 1962. - 7 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

e. Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC). The work of the EIC and its subcommittees covers a wide variety of specialized fields of economic analysis to which specialists within and without the USIB agencies can make unique contributions. Moreover, no single USIB agency has such a primary responsibility, either on an area or functional basis, that the concept of a "service of common concern" can be made to apply. Thus, the Economic Intelligence Committee should be retained, since its responsibilities involve the coordination of important functional programs necessarily related to the normal responsibilities of the various USIB agencies as well as some nine non-USIB agencies.

f. Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC).* The Scientific Intelligence Committee should be retained because of its general production and coordination responsibilities in an important field in which several USIB agencies have large active programs.

g. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)* and Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC).* The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee should also be retained because of the critical importance of their individual responsibilities, the direct and priority national security significance of these subjects that touch upon the responsibilities of all USIB member agencies and the concomitant need for civilian as well as military agencies to participate actively in the deliberations of the two Committees.

h. Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC). Recent USIB actions to intensify collection efforts in [REDACTED], as well as current community interest in improving collection in a number of important scientific and technical fields, illustrate the need for a mechanism which can ensure that collection efforts utilizing all community resources in these and other similar major problem areas are adequately coordinated, and which can anticipate collection problems and undertake remedial action thereon on its own initiative.

* Because of the close relationship of these three scientific committees, close coordination is imperative. The SIC should be charged with taking the initiative in insuring that such coordination is effected in areas of joint or overlapping concern, such as the field of anti-ballistic missiles. This does not imply that SIC should have a supervisory role over the normal activities of JAEIC and GMAIC in their respective fields.

S-E-C-R-E-T


S-E-C-R-E-T

The CCPC, as now established, cannot fill the need, since its activities are limited by DCID No. 2/2 solely to those collection problems of a critical nature specifically referred to it by the USIB. The required mechanism could be provided by broadening the present charter of the CCPC (DCID No. 2/2) to permit the Committee to concern itself with collection problems of general community interest referred to it by USIB, by a USIB committee or agency, or identified by the committee itself. In dealing with such problems, the revised CCPC should have essentially those responsibilities listed in paragraph 1 of DCID No. 2/2:

- (1) Making an inventory of collection capabilities or action being taken or planned.
- (2) Allocating by agreement or recommending actions to be taken to improve collection capabilities.
- (3) Fostering the generation of new ideas and techniques for collection; selecting those of value and supporting their development and use.
- (4) Studying results of collection actions in order to recommend improvements.
- (5) Recommending actions to improve speed and accuracy of collection and dissemination of information.

The revised and strengthened CCPC should keep itself fully informed of the collection activities of the more specialized USIB committees in order to ensure that the activities of such specialized committees bearing on an identified problem are appropriately coordinated and correlated with other collection activities. The chairman should be prepared, at least in the initial stages of development of the new CCPC, to devote his full time, perhaps assisted by a small professional staff, in establishing a continuous basis for community-wide scrutiny of and action on collection problems.

i. Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR),



- 9 -

Corrected page - 7 June 1962.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1



REC

10. The following USIB ad hoc committees and working groups should be removed from the USIB committee category and be redesignated or disestablished as follows:

a. Ad Hoc Committee on the Berlin Situation. The work of this substantive committee covers a continuing problem directly related to the responsibilities of the Watch Committee and involves military, political and psychological factors. The Committee has been recessed by recent USIB action. When and if the Committee resumes activity, it should be redesignated as a subcommittee of the Watch Committee.

b. Ad Hoc Committee on the Cuban Military Build-up. The work of this substantive committee covers, by definition, a military problem that is clearly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense. The Committee should be disestablished and its functions performed in accordance with normal production responsibilities.

c. Ad Hoc Committee on Legislative Proposals re Personnel Security. The Committee will soon complete the work for which it was established. Upon completion of that task, the Committee should be disestablished.

d. Ad Hoc Working Group on the Arab-Israeli Situation. The work of this substantive group covers a continuing problem which will be dealt with in connection with USIB's consideration of cold war situations. This group should be disestablished and any necessary special reports on the subject be prepared in accordance with normal agency production responsibilities.

- 10 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

11. Committee Chairmen. The coordination responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the Central Intelligence Agency have, traditionally, tended to suggest that CIA provide the chairmen for the great majority of the USIB committees. In fact, however, these committees are responsible to the USIB and not to any single agency. Nonetheless, where the interest of any one agency is clearly dominant, that agency should furnish the chairman. Under the proposed new committee structure, however, there are a number of cases in which it is difficult to demonstrate that a single agency has such a dominant interest as would clearly entitle it to leadership; in such cases, the principle of personal qualification rather than agency affiliation should prevail. In any case, a chairman of a USIB committee should in that capacity be considered as a representative of USIB and should report to the Chairman of USIB.*

To state these principles of chairmanship is not to imply that changes in existing chairmanships are necessary or warranted. It is proposed, however, that in the future a USIB committee chairman be selected on the basis of the principles outlined, and that he be expected to report on his chairmanship to the Chairman of USIB who should also evaluate his performance of this task.

12. USIB Secretariat. The USIB Secretariat should devote increased efforts in ensuring that papers coming before the Board have had, where appropriate, adequate preliminary coordination and in conducting an effective follow-up system on Board decisions.

* In cases where it is determined that the chairman should be assigned on a full-time basis, his parent agency should provide another individual as its member on the committee.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130028-1

Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP80B01083A000100130028-1